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1Abstract
This paper empirically tests whether Irish and UK petrol and diesel markets are char-
acterised by asymmetric pricing behaviour. The econometric assessment uses threshold
autoregressive models and a dataset of monthly reﬁned oil and retail prices covering
the period 1997 to mid-2009. A methodological note is included on the importance of
the speciﬁcation of the number of possible regimes. In particular, the possibility of con-
ﬂicting price pressures arising from short-run dynamics in retail prices and responses
to disequilibrium errors needs to be explicitly modelled. For both the Irish and UK
liquid fuel markets at national levels, the paper concludes that there is no evidence to
support the “rockets and feathers” hypothesis that retail prices rise faster than they
fall in response to changes in oil prices. It is still possible that a lack of competition at
a more local level may accommodate asymmetric pricing behaviour.Non Technical Summary
Although there is evidence to suggest that the proﬁt margins in Irish transport fuel markets
are relatively modest, the perception persists that the retail transport fuel market in Ireland
is not entirely competitive with consumers not beneﬁtting from falls in crude oil prices with
the same rapidity as they are burdened with rises in crude oil prices. This perception is
to a large extent based on anecdotal evidence only, as there is a dearth of studies that
have empirically tested whether Irish fuel markets are characterised by asymmetric pricing
behaviour. The National Consumer Agency (NCA) investigated the movements of reﬁned
prices, wholesale prices and retail pump prices in Ireland during 2008. While the NCA
concluded that there is little evidence to suggest unwarranted delays in the passing through
of reﬁned oil price falls to consumer prices, their study was based on a just one year of data
and did not assess the issue using econometric models.
This paper contains a rigorous econometric assessment of the pass-through of oil prices
in Irish liquid fuel markets using a long span of data. The UK fuels market is also examined
for comparison purposes. The econometric analysis uses threshold autoregressive models
to test for asymmetries, which allow for the possibility of response rates changing when
passing a non-zero threshold rather than the typical zero threshold in models of asymmetry.
The threshold model approach has intuitive appeal and is consistent with a variety of
pricing behaviour models presented in the industrial organisation literature. A second
methodological improvement is the use of multi-regime models. This type of model takes
explicit account of price pressures from diﬀerent sources in the system of equations.
For both the Irish and UK liquid fuel markets at national levels, the paper concludes
that there is no evidence to support the “rockets and feathers” hypothesis that retail prices
rise faster than they fall in response to changes in oil prices. The retail fuel markets are
quite competitive, particularly for Ireland. The market here is characterised by modest
proﬁt margins and a relatively high number of ﬁlling stations per head of population. This
type of market structure is not consistent with asymmetric pricing. From this viewpoint,
despite a common perception of asymmetric pricing behaviour on the part of fuel retailers,
the results are consistent with the market structure.1 Introduction
The heightened volatility in international crude oil prices in recent years has intensiﬁed
interest in aspects of the pass-through of oil prices to retail prices in the domestic fuel
market. In particular, interest has focused on the speed of the pass-through of oil prices
and any possible associated asymmetric pricing behaviour that may suggest retailers have
some short-run market power. Generally, when a market is perfectly competitive, the price
setting behaviour of ﬁrms is symmetric in reaction to increases or decreases of the same order
of magnitude in input costs. Although there is evidence to suggest that the proﬁt margins
in Irish transport fuel wholesale and retail markets are relatively modest, the perception
persists that the retail transport fuel market in Ireland is not entirely competitive with
consumers not beneﬁtting from falls in crude oil prices with the same rapidity as they are
burdened with rises in crude oil prices. Indeed, the Department of Enterprise, Trade and
Employment commissioned a study in September 2008 to identify “why pump prices for
petrol and diesel have not fallen in line with the drop in the wholesale price of oil”.
While the issue of pass-through of oil prices to liquid fuel prices has been treated ex-
tensively for the US and larger euro area countries, there is a dearth of studies assessing
the oil price pass-through and possible asymmetries in the Irish liquid fuels (petrol, diesel
and heating fuel) markets. The National Consumer Agency (NCA) studied the relationship
between crude prices and downstream product prices but the main analysis relied on graph-
ical illustrations based on data for 2008 only. The pass-through in Ireland has also been
examined by Meyler (2009) using standard asymmetric error correction models as part of
study across 12 euro area countries. We adopt a more sophisticated econometric model, the
threshold autoregressive model, which we argue has more intuitive appeal. Such a model
allows for the possibility of response rates changing when passing a non-zero threshold
rather than the typical zero threshold. At the same time, we provide extensive Irish con-
text by, for example, discussing structural indicators for the Irish market. The econometric
model is estimated based on a long time series of reﬁned oil and retail (petrol and diesel)
prices. Therefore, this paper addresses a signiﬁcant gap in the literature. An assessment of
the structure and pricing behaviour in these markets can also provide a stronger basis for
short-term inﬂation forecasting exercises and a better understanding of the direct eﬀects of
oil price shocks.
Various structural indicators of liquid fuel markets in Ireland are examined to shed some
1preliminary light on the issue of a possible lack of eﬀective competition. The main focus
of this paper is to determine the pass-through rates and test for asymmetries in Irish fuel
markets but the equivalent pass-through rates in the UK are also examined in order to
provide some context. It is important to note that, if there are asymmetries, this analysis
does not identify why these pricing asymmetries occur or at what stage of the supply chain
(wholesale or retail) they may arise. We propose to use a threshold autoregressive model
to ascertain whether signiﬁcant asymmetries characterise Irish and UK liquid fuel markets.
Such a non-linear modelling approach has some intuitive appeal, with the higher pass-
through kicking in when a certain threshold is passed. While the analysis uses long time
series and sophisticated econometric techniques the results on oil price pass-through rates
come with some caveats attached. There are challenges to assessing the pass-through of oil
prices in the case of Ireland which may limit the robustness of the results. These include
the low frequency of the data, which are only available at a monthly frequency whereas a
weekly or higher frequency would be preferable. Cross-subsidisation may also distort the
pass-through with retailers supporting revenues by increasing margins in non-fuel items to
oﬀset tighter margins in pump prices.
The paper takes the following structure. Section 2 brieﬂy discusses the results from
previous studies on the oil pass-through to retail pump prices for the Irish and other euro
area countries’ markets. The subsequent section describes the structure of the fuel markets
in Ireland using on a range of indicators of competition while also providing some further
background information on the pricing mechanisms involved. The data used for the study
of pass-through and asymmetries is described in Section 4. Sections 5 introduces the various
modelling approaches while Section 6 describes the results. Section 7 presents a method-
ological note on the importance of a multi-regime speciﬁcation in threshold autoregressive
models. Finally, Section 8 summarises the ﬁndings and concludes that broadly there is
no evidence to support the view that retail prices rise faster in Irish and UK liquid fuel
markets at national levels than they fall in response to oil price changes.
2 Oil Price Direct Pass-through Literature
There are numerous studies of oil pricing asymmetries, forming part of the extensive “rock-
ets and feathers” literature that examines whether retail prices rise faster than they fall in
2response to changes in oil prices. Many of these studies have been undertaken for fuel mar-
kets in the US and larger euro area countries and have adopted a wide range of econometric
approaches. Borenstein et al. (1997), in a seminal paper, examined price asymmetries in
US gasoline markets and found retail prices showed asymmetry to crude oil price changes,
possibly reﬂecting inventory adjustment eﬀects. Geweke (2004) contains an excellent explo-
ration of the econometric issues faced in analyses of pricing asymmetries in fuel markets and
provides a useful critique of the important empirical studies on US fuel markets available
up to that point. With a broader geographical coverage, Manera and Frey (2007) discusses
the results from the various empirical studies undertaken in analysing asymmetries in price
transmission generally while also providing a comprehensive overview of the alternative
econometric approaches adopted.
There are a limited number of studies that examine the pricing behaviour in Irish fuel
markets. The NCA Report investigated the movements of reﬁned prices, wholesale prices
and retail pump prices in Ireland during 2008. While the NCA Report concluded that
there is little evidence to suggest unwarranted delays in the passing through of wholesale
price changes consumer prices, their study was based on a just one year of data and did
not assess the issue using econometric models. The study presented valuable information
on the working of the liquid fuels industry in Ireland. Meyler (2009) examines the oil pass-
through across all euro area countries using a standard asymmetry model and uses levels
data rather than the standard approach in the literature of modelling the series in logs.
The broad conclusion arrived at in the study is that the pass-through in euro area countries
generally is full and quick and there are no signiﬁcant pricing asymmetries.
The standard asymmetry model may be mis-speciﬁed as there is likely to be a ﬁxed cost
associated with price changes such that ﬁrms make adjustments to prices only when the
input cost change is suﬃciently large to justify incurring the cost of implementing the price
change. A threshold autoregressive model (TAR) may be used to allow for such a non-zero
threshold eﬀect i.e. asymmetric pricing is only triggered by a minimum absolute change
in crude (or reﬁned) oil costs. The TAR model is a more general form of the standard
asymmetry model with the threshold arbitrarily set to zero in the case of the latter. The
threshold variable is typically based on the current price change or on the average price
change over a number of time periods. These models tend to focus more on the short-run
asymmetries - lag to initial response and the duration of the response - rather than the
3long-run response - whether the cost change is fully passed through. The Hansen (1998)
bootstrap approach is commonly used to test the null hypothesis of a linear model against
the TAR alternative.
While the TAR approach has much intuitive appeal, the added value from adopting a
threshold pricing approach depends on the accuracy of the estimate of the true threshold
and on whether the threshold is economically and statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. Al-Gudhea et al. (2007) found evidence in support of threshold pricing for the
US gasoline market while Asplund et al. (2000) also identiﬁed some threshold pricing in
Swedish gasoline markets although the ﬁxed costs appeared to be relatively small. Finally,
Godby et al. (2000) applied TAR models to the Canadian gasoline markets but did not
ﬁnd any evidence to support pricing asymmetries. The threshold autoregressive model is
explained in greater detail in Section 5.
3 Structure of the Irish Oil Market
The recent report by the National Consumer Agency provides a detailed examination of
the various stages of the oil market. This oil market is currently entirely downstream in
nature i.e. activities in the industry are restricted to reﬁning, storage, distribution and
sales of reﬁned products. Crude oil is imported to Whitegate, Ireland’s only oil reﬁnery,
while reﬁned oil is imported to wholesalers’ storage depots located around the country. The
wholesalers in turn sell to distributors or directly to retailers while the distributors sell to
a range of industrial and service station retailers. There are no oil pipelines in Ireland so
the product is transported entirely by road or by sea, which can add signiﬁcantly to costs
relative to the UK where there are oil pipelines.
The price of interest in this paper is the price charged to consumers and there is some
tentative evidence to suggest that the retail market is relatively competitive. Over 75 per
cent of service stations are independently owned but many operate under Solas agreements
whereby the retailer is tied to a certain supplier for typically a period of ﬁve years. However,
these retailers along with service stations licensed by oil companies can set their own prices.
In terms of concentration, there are no restrictions on the number of stations. There are up
to 2,034 service stations in Ireland and the number of stations per capita in Ireland is one
station for every 2,020 inhabitants. This compares with one station per 9,539 inhabitants
4in the UK and one station per 3,113 people in Northern Ireland. In 2005, the market
share of three largest ﬁrms in Irish retail transport fuel sector was about 53 per cent
while the corresponding share for the euro area was 49 per cent.1 Turning to the proﬁts
of Irish subsidiaries of oil ﬁrms, an analysis of proﬁts by the NCA, which looked at the
ﬁnancial accounts of large oil ﬁrms, suggests that net proﬁts after tax as a proportion of
the cost of sales (including from non-fuel sales) are quite modest at between 0.6 per cent
and 2.3 per cent. Altogether, this suggests that the market structure at national level is
comparatively competitive although fuel markets are essentially local in nature and the
degree of competition may vary signiﬁcantly across regions, cities and towns.
While the frequency of price changes in the wholesale market can be quite high, the
prices often tend to be based on monthly averages of reﬁned oil prices. About 30 per cent
of the oil imported into Ireland is destined for the Whitegate oil reﬁnery, with the majority
of customers (about 60 per cent) of Whitegate paying monthly averages for reﬁned oil
while the remaining customers pay based on twice weekly rates. Wholesalers that purchase
imported reﬁned oil mainly pay at a price based on the average of the month and tend
to change their selling prices twice a week based on the average of reﬁned prices over the
previous two or three days. Currency and other hedging may also dampen ﬂuctuations in
the wholesale price. As a result, any slow speed of pass-through of reﬁned prices to wholesale
prices may partly reﬂect a degree of smoothness in prices due to trading on futures markets
although it would not explain any persistent asymmetries in pricing. The frequency of price
changes at the retail stage is also quite high. The pricing mechanism for fuel products may
be distorted somewhat as retailers may avail of opportunities for cross-selling with higher
margins in non-fuel items, such as food and beverages, compensating for tighter margins
in petrol and diesel. Moreover, the entry of large supermarket chain such as Tesco into
the petrol and diesel retail markets may have accelerated this trend, although the impact
is likely limited to a relatively small number of localities for now, particularly given that
retail size restrictions remain in place.
4 Data for Price Pass-through and Asymmetries Analysis
There are a number of choices to make in terms of the data for a study of this nature. For
the international oil price, one can use the price of either crude or reﬁned oil. The prices
1The corresponding ﬁgure for the UK is not available.
5of reﬁned gas and diesel are used in this study, as reﬁned prices reﬂect the cost to the
wholesaler or retailer more closely than crude prices. The reﬁning margins have ﬂuctuated
signiﬁcantly in recent years, particularly for diesel, and therefore using crude prices are
not an appropriate proxy for the prices ultimately paid by the wholesaler or retailer. The
reﬁned oil prices are Rotterdam gasoline and diesel prices in dollars per barrel converted to
euro per litre. Regarding the retail price, again there are two options - including the pre-tax
or ﬁnal tax-inclusive retail price in the study. The choice of retail price depends on the
research question. The emphasis in this paper will be on the pass-through to the pre-tax
price, as this price is controlled by retailers. The monthly pre-tax petrol and diesel price
level data are taken from the European Commission Weekly Oil Bulletin and unpublished
monthly price indices for petrol and diesel are kindly provided by the CSO.
All data are at a monthly frequency and at national level. Ideally, the data would be at a
weekly or higher frequency and available at local level rather than national. There are higher
frequency data available on user websites such www.pumps.ie but they are of questionable
reliability. There are also wholesale price data available from www.fuelsonlineprices.com.
Any ﬁnding of asymmetry between reﬁned oil price changes and retail price changes could
be further investigated in a follow-up study on the wholesale and retail stages separately
to identify at which stage it may be more of an issue. In this respect, it is interesting to
note that the margins seem to be of a similar order at both stages - around 2.5 cents per
litre. The monthly prices data for the UK have also been taken from the EC Weekly Oil
Bulletin. The data collection methodologies for Irish and UK data may diﬀer somewhat
so comparisons may not be strictly comparable. Prices in the fuel supply chain in Ireland
are often based on monthly averages, which suggests that the pass-through in the case of
Ireland may be relatively sluggish and any signiﬁcant asymmetries may still be picked up
using data of a monthly frequency.
5 Estimating Asymmetry
5.1 Basic Cointegration Model
The price of liquid fuels at retail level closely follows developments in reﬁned prices. Figure
1 shows the price of reﬁned gasoline together with the retail price of petrol. The strong
observed comovement between retail and reﬁned prices is suggestive of a cointegrating
6relationship between the two. Figure 2 shows the logs of these prices, with separate scales
this time. Again, there is strong comovement with the log series.2 This implies a long-run
relationship of the form
PCt = α + φPRt + ǫt (1)
where PCt is the consumer or retail price at time t and PRt is the reﬁned price. Augmented
Dickey-Fuller tests ﬁnd that all the price series contain a unit root regardless of whether
we use logs or levels. Using the Engle-Granger two-step approach, the residual of the long-
run equation is checked for a unit root and the null of no cointegration between reﬁned
and retail prices is very strongly rejected in each case3 and so our initial statistical tests
conﬁrm the commonly found cointegrating relationship between retail and reﬁned prices.
This relationship allows us to embed the long-run residual, which is the ECM term ǫt =
ecmt = PCt − φPRt − α in an error correction model (ECM) of the form:







The existence of a cointegrating relationship between reﬁned and retail prices for both
logs and levels means we have a choice in terms of how to specify the model. Although
speciﬁcation in terms of logs is standard in most econometric models, we choose the levels
speciﬁcation for both statistical and conceptual reasons. Statistically, the long-run equation
shows much stronger cointegration properties when speciﬁed in levels rather than logs.
Furthermore, in a study of European fuel prices, Meyler (2009) ﬁnds that there can be
instability in the long-run relationship if speciﬁed in logs but this problem does not arise
in the levels speciﬁcation. The ﬁnal statistical beneﬁt of the levels speciﬁcation is in terms
of the ﬁt of the short-run equations. We ﬁnd there is considerable improvement in the R2
of the short-run equation when the speciﬁcation is in levels.
It also makes more sense theoretically to specify the model in terms of absolute price
levels because a one cent increase in reﬁned prices will lead to a one cent increase in pre-tax
prices if there is full pass-through. However, the impact of a one per cent increase in reﬁned
prices on post-tax prices will depend on the actual level of reﬁned and retail prices. There is
2The graphs for diesel show similar properties.
3The results of unit root tests and cointegration tests are not presented in the interests of brevity but
are available from the authors upon request.
7a large tax element to retail prices. This mainly consists of excise duty, which is a ﬁxed tax,
and VAT, which is an ad valorem tax. The tax element accounts for a larger percentage
of the retail price when prices are low and a smaller percentage when prices are higher.
Therefore, if we model in logs, pass-through will depend on the price level. This can be
avoided by using a model in levels. For this reason, together with the superior statistical
properties, the log speciﬁcation is dropped in favour of the levels speciﬁcation for the rest
of the analysis. The levels speciﬁcation could result in a problem with heteroscedasticity so
all results presented later are based on Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent
(HAC) standard errors.
From the equations above, it is implied that the cointegration relationship is estimated
using the Engle-Granger two-step procedure. In the interests of robustness, we also use
the ARDL approach suggested by Peseran, Shin and Smith (2001). This approach uses a
one-step non-linear estimator, in which the long-run cointegrating relationship is embeded
in the short-run equation. In Table 1, we present the estimates of the intercept, α and the
slope coeﬃcient, φ, from the long-run equation for both the ARDL non-linear estimator
and the OLS estimator of the Engle-Granger two-step procedure. The ARDL method and
the OLS method yield very similar results for both petrol and diesel in both the UK and
Irish markets. Although not formally tested, it is clear that the diﬀerences in the parameter
estimates are well within the bounds of statistical variation. This suggests that the results
of the study are not sensitive to the choice of estimator. For this reason, we conduct our
tests of asymmetry with the standard OLS estimator, as outlined in the equations above.
5.2 Simple Models of Asymmetry
The standard cointegration model is not suﬃciently rich to capture the underlying dynamics
if there is asymmetry in the transmission of changes in the price of reﬁned oil4 to retail
prices. The model presented in equation 2 implicitly assumes symmetric adjustment around
∆PRt = 0, so that all coeﬃcients are the same regardless of whether changes in reﬁned
prices are positive or negative. To allow a diﬀerent response to positive and negative reﬁned





1 if TRt > τ
0 if TRt ≤ τ
4We use the general term “reﬁned oil” instead of referring to both reﬁned gasoline and reﬁned diesel.
8where TRt is the value of the threshold variable at time t and τ is the estimate of the
threshold. In the zero threshold model, the threshold variable is the change in the reﬁned
price, ∆PRt, and τ is zero. The model can then be expressed as:






β1,i∆PRt−i, It = 1 (3)






β2,i∆PRt−i, It = 0 (4)
One set of parameters apply when the change in the reﬁned price is positive and another set
when that change is negative. Although the model is presented as two separate equations
to clarify the concept, estimation proceeds in a single equation manner. The equations
above can give rise to a number of diﬀerent types of asymmetry and we consider three
alternatives. We ﬁrst estimate a model in which the only source of asymmetry is through
diﬀerent parameters for the ECM term. The speed of adjustment towards equilibrium varies
depending on the value of the threshold variable.5 In terms of the coeﬃcients, this model
means that θ1  = θ2 but the other coeﬃcients in the model are restricted to be the same in
both regimes. In the second type of model, we only allow asymmetry in the lags coeﬃcients
on the reﬁned price. In this scenario, the ECM coeﬃcient is the same in both regimes.
Thus the β1,i and β2,i coeﬃcients vary but the other coeﬃcients are constant. Finally, we
allow both the ECM and lag parameters to vary. This is the most ﬂexible model but the
lags on the autoregressive terms and the constant are still invariant across regimes. We do
not allow the autoregressive parameters to change because the price pressures in the system
should come through the equilibrium error and the change in the upstream price.
In the preceeding discussion, the threshold was deﬁned to be the change in the reﬁned
price. We also allow for alternative threshold variables. In particular, we allow the lagged
change in the reﬁned price and a moving average of recent price changes as two alternative
threshold variables. The moving average is based on the current change and the lagged
changes from the past two months. For each of the three threshold variables, we estimate
the three models of asymmetry described above to give a total of nine models of the zero
threshold variety. We present and discuss results in a later section once all asymmetric
models have been explained.
5Although asymmetric responses in the ECM are permitted, the long-run cointegrating relationship
between the reﬁned price and the retail price represented in equation (1) must still be identical for price
increases and decreases. This restriction is required to prevent the possibility of ever widening margins.
9Figure 3 presents a graphical representation of a zero threshold model. The graph shows
the change in retail prices on the Y axis for a given change in the reﬁned price on the X axis.
This is for illustration purposes so it only represents the short-run response. The black line
represents the symmetric case. In this hypothetical economy, half the change in the crude
price is reﬂected in the retail price in the symmetric case. The dashed line represents the
asymmetric case. When the change in the crude price is negative, one quarter of the change
is reﬂected in the retail price. The diminished responsiveness relative to the symmetric case
is evident from the fact that the black line is closer to the X axis when below zero. If the
change in the reﬁned price is positive, the change in the retail price is more responsive for
the asymmetric model with three quarters of the crude change passed through to reﬁned
prices. Although simplistic by design, this example highlights the nature of a model with
a zero threshold.
5.3 Interpreting the Model
The speciﬁcation presented through equations 3 and 4 is the basic approach to specifying
asymmetry in a cointegration framework. Parameter change models based on indicator
variables are quite standard tools in econometrics. However, one needs to be very careful
in terms of the interpretation of this model. In this section, we present the results for the
long run equations for the pre-tax petrol and diesel models. This gives us an insight into
the behaviour of the equilibrium error, which then allows us to describe the model more
intuitively.
Returning to Table 1, which presents the estimates of the coeﬃcients of the long-run
equations, consider the OLS results for the Irish models. The coeﬃcient on the reﬁned
price, φ, is close to one in both cases. This shows that movements in the reﬁned price are
matched almost one for one with movements in the retail price. The intercept, lambda,
in these equations is an estimate of the equilibrium margin between retail and reﬁned
prices. This is approximately 17 cent for petrol and 19 cent for diesel in the sample. The
equilibrium error has already been expressed as ecmt = PCt − φPRt − α. Given that
φ ≈ 1, this equilibrium error is the current margin between retail and reﬁned prices less
the equilibrium margin.
The intuition becomes more obvious when we examine Figure 5, which depicts both the
10margin between retail and reﬁned prices and the equilibrium error. The graph shows that
when the equilibrium error is positive, the margin between retail and reﬁned prices is above
its long-run average with the corollary true when the equilibrium error is negative. Given
the coeﬃcient of close to one in the long-run equation, changes in the equilibrium error
largely reﬂect changes in the retailer’s margin. Retail prices lag reﬁned prices under the
assumed pass-through relationship. It follows that the equilibrium error will be positive,
and so the margin above its long-run average, when there has previously been a fall in
the reﬁned price. This is borne out by the data, which show a large negative correlation
between the value of the equilibrium residuals and the change in the reﬁned price.
If retailers allow prices to rise more quickly than they fall, as posited in the rockets
and feathers literature, this will be represented by a larger coeﬃcient on the positive ECM
term. Positive equilibrium errors typically correspond to a period of falling reﬁned prices.
The speed of adjustment coeﬃcient is always negative as it is working to bring the system
back to equilibrium. In an asymmetric model, a smaller coeﬃcient on the positive ECM
term relative to the negative means that there is less downward pressure on retail prices
to restore the equilibrium margin after a period of falling reﬁned prices compared to the
upward pressure on retail prices following a period of increasing reﬁned prices. This is the
type of asymmetry we search for in the ECM coeﬃcients.
We have mentioned three possible threshold variables for the paper - the current, lagged
and moving average change in the reﬁned price. The approach described in equations (3)
and (4) allows certain coeﬃcients in the model to vary depending on the value of the change
in the reﬁned price and this approach is often adopted in the literature. The value of the
equilibrium error is another source of price pressure in the system. A model which divides
the sample according to positive or negative values of the threshold variable does not result
in a corresponding division of the equilibrium error into positive and negative values. There
may be conﬂicting price pressures from the change in the reﬁned price and the value of the
equilibrium error. It is readily apparent that four possible cases arise.
Interactions between ECM and short-run dynamics
ECM(+) ECM(-)
∆PR(+) (1) + − (2) + +
∆PR(−) (3) - − (4) - +
11In the ﬁrst regime, both the equilibrium error and the change in the upstream price are
positive. A positive equilibrium error means that retail prices are above their equilibrium
level so there will be downward pressure on the retail price. The change in the retail
price and the error correction mechanism will work against each other in this situation. In
regime 2, both the positive change in the reﬁned price and the negative equilibrium error
exert upward pressure on retail prices and in regime 3 they both exert downward pressure.
Regime 4 again represents a scenario where there are opposing price pressures.
We believe that the comparison between regimes 2 and 3 is the most valid, as there are
no conﬂicting price pressures. The model as presented in equations (3) and (4) partitions
the sample according to positive and negative changes in the reﬁned price. However, when
the change in the reﬁned price is positive, the equilibrium error can still take on positive
values, putting opposing pressure on price. If we wish to distinguish between the behaviour
of retailers when price pressures are unequivocally positive or negative, we must compare
regime 2 with regime 3. For this reason, we estimate threshold models with four diﬀerent
regimes and the ECM and lag coeﬃcients can vary in each regime.
5.4 Threshold Models of Asymmetry
It may not be the case the threshold is actually zero in practice. Retailers may change
their behaviour when the change in the reﬁned price, be it positive or negative, passes
some threshold value other than zero. A non-zero threshold could arise for cost and com-
petitiveness reasons or simply as a result of strategic pricing. In this section, we consider
non-zero threshold models of asymmetry. It is possible to test for non-zero thresholds using
a procedure developed by Hansen (1998).
The threshold model extends the model presented above in a natural way. Instead of
deﬁning the indicator variable according to values of the threshold variable above and below
zero, a non-zero value of τ is now permitted as the threshold estimate. Figure 4 provides a
graphical representation. In the example shown, the behaviour of the dashed line, which is
indicated by its slope, is the same for negative and small positive changes in the threshold.
However, for larger positive changes in the reﬁned price, the responsiveness of the retail
price increases dramatically, as represented by the large jump in the graph.
12In terms of implementing this approach, the candidate threshold variable TRt is ordered
by size and 15% of the tails are trimmed. For each possible remaining value of the threshold,
a model like that in equation (3) is estimated. The residual sum of squares and threshold
value is recorded for each model. The model with the lowest residual sum of squares is taken
as the estimate of the threshold. Hansen (1998) provides a bootstrap procedure to test for
the statistical signiﬁcance of the threshold estimate and we use 5000 replications in our
test.6 As with the zero threshold models, we consider three threshold variables and three
types of asymmetric model meaning that a total of nine models are estimated. Standard
model selection criteria are used to choose between them. For each model, we calculate
the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (SBC) and the
appropriate model is chosen based on consideration of these two statistics in conjunction
with the adjusted R2.
It is equally appropriate to consider the four diﬀerent regimes when implementing the
non-zero threshold. The threshold procedure trims 15% of the tails. If the threshold value
chosen by the procedure is close to the trimmed portion, there is a relatively small number
of observations above the threshold value. As the values lying above the threshold also need
to be divided according to positive and negative values of the equilibrium error, there may
not be enough observations in one or both regimes to get accurate parameter estimates.
We consider two methods to deal with this problem depending on the data. Generally,
most observations that are above threshold are associated with a negative equilibrium
error, which represents the unequivocally positive case (Regime 2). As there are so few
observations for the regime with positive equilibrium errors and above threshold, this regime
is merged with the regime corresponding to negative equilibrium errors and below threshold.
In other words, the two regimes with conﬂicting price pressures are collapsed to one regime
with comparison still valid between the wholly positive and negative regimes. In other cases,
for observations above the threshold, there may be a more even split between positive and
negative equilibrium error. If this leads to estimation problems, the 15% trim is expanded
to a 20% trim. In practice, we favour the three regime approach, which collapses the two
regimes with conﬂicting price pressures to one regime, as it allows a more comprehensive
threshold search.
6For further details of the testing procedure, see Hansen (1998).
136 Results
6.1 Asymmetry in the Irish Market
In Table 2, we present the model selection criteria for both pre-tax petrol and diesel mod-
els. The AIC and SBC are calculated such that a smaller value indicates a better ﬁt.
Results are presented for a standard ECM model with no asymmetry, an asymmetric ECM
model, a zero threshold model and a non-zero threshold model in the cases where a non-
zero threshold exists. These terms are explained in the previous section but a glossary of
model descriptions is provided at the back of the paper for convenience. The table shows
the model, the type of asymmetry allowed, the threshold variable and the model selection
statistics. The speciﬁcation column is mainly for use with the threshold models and indi-
cates if asymmetry is permitted in the ECM term, the lags or both the ECM and the lags.
For each type of model, results are presented for the model with the best diagnostics out
of the nine possible combinations of threshold variable and asymmetry type.
The ﬁrst row in each section presents the results for the basic model with no asymmetry.
These models tend to perform quite well on an individual basis in the sense that the R2 of
the basic models is quite high. In the case of petrol, there is a marginal deterioration in
model ﬁt according to the AIC and SBC when asymmetry is permitted in the ECM term.
This type of asymmetry is based on a positive or negative equilibrium error and so the
choice of threshold is not relevant in this case. When we consider a zero threshold for the
current change in reﬁned prices, there is an improvement in the ﬁt of the model according
to all statistics. This is a three regime model. When the threshold on the change in the
reﬁned price is allowed a non-zero value, there is some evidence of a threshold at -0.4c for
the moving average change. While this model improves on the symmetric model according
to some statistics, it fails to outperform the zero threshold model based on the current
change in reﬁned prices, which is the preferred model for petrol.
In the case of diesel, the basic model ﬁts the data quite well although the R2 is smaller
than that of the symmetric petrol model. For the zero threshold ECM model, there is a
slight improvement in ﬁt according to the AIC and R2. When we also allow for asymmetry
based on a zero threshold for the moving average of the reﬁned price, the resulting model
again improves the ﬁt according to all the model selection statistics. Once again, the
conﬂicting price regimes are collapsed so the chosen model has three regimes. For diesel,
14there is no evidence of a non-zero threshold for any of the candidate threshold variables so
the model selected is the three regime model.
Table 3 presents the coeﬃcients for the chosen petrol and diesel model. In both cases, a
three regime model which allows asymmetric behaviour in the lag response is selected. The
“2” superscript on the lag coeﬃcients denotes the coeﬃcients for the regime with positive
price pressures, the “3” superscript applies to the regime with negative price pressure and
the lags without a superscript refer to the regime with conﬂicting price pressure. For
petrol, the ECM coeﬃcient indicates that 43% of any equilibrium error is eliminated in
the following period, implying quite a fast speed of adjustment. If we sum the coeﬃcients
on the lag terms for each regime, we get a total of 0.614, 0.473 and 0.662 for the positive,
conﬂicting and negative regimes respectively. The coeﬃcient sums are larger for the outer
regimes so that adjustment is quicker when the price pressures are persistently in either
the positive or negative direction. However, the summed coeﬃcients are very similar for
the positive and negative regimes. We test the null hypothesis that these coeﬃcient sums
are not equal. As the residuals are non-normal, we use a bootstrap procedure with 5000
replications to construct the test statistic and reject the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcient
sums are not equal. There is no evidence that pass-through is greater for positive changes
in the reﬁned price. In the case of negative price pressures, the eﬀect is contemporaneous in
the sense that adjustment takes place in period t. For the positive regime, the bulk of the
adjustment takes place in t − 1. Thus, although the magnitude of adjustment is the same
for the positive and negative regimes, adjustment is marginally quicker for the negative
regime.
A similar pattern emerges in the diesel market. The ECM coeﬃcient is almost -0.7,
indicating that a lot of the adjustment in the model is taking place through the error
correction mechanism and the coeﬃcients on reﬁned prices changes are correspondingly
smaller. The summed coeﬃcients are 0.404, 0.159 and 0.532 for the positive, conﬂicting
and negative regimes respectively. Once again, the conﬂicting regime has a more sluggish
response. The reaction to negative price changes is again contemporaneous. For positive
price changes, half of the pass-through takes place in period t−2. The negative pass-though
coeﬃcient is a bit stronger than the sum of the positive but the null hypothesis that they are
not equal is rejected at the 5% level. Again, there is no evidence in favour of the perception
that prices increase faster than they fall. The results of these models indicate that there
15is asymmetry in the market, as asymmetric models outperform symmetric models. The
retail price response is faster when price pressures are either wholly positive or negative. In
addition, the negative response appears to be marginally quicker than the positive response.
The retail of petrol and diesel is a very competitive industry in Ireland and is characterised
by tight margins. The asymmetry found in the models is consistent with this type of
market.
6.2 Asymmetry in the UK Market
Table 4 provides an overview of the model selection criteria for the UK. The results for
the UK refer to pre-tax prices again. The R2 for the basic symmetric petrol model is 86%,
which is higher than the corresponding ﬁgure of 79% for the Irish petrol market. When
we allow asymmetry based on the ECM term, there is virtually no change in the ﬁt of
the model. For the zero threshold in the reﬁned price, the AIC again remains unchanged.
There is a minor improvement in the R2 but the SBC indicates a slightly poorer ﬁt. Finally,
a non-zero threshold model is considered. The threshold is estimated at 0.5c based on the
moving average change in the reﬁned price. The four regime model was again collapsed to
three regimes by merging the regimes with conﬂicting price pressures. The resulting model
is a multi-regime non-zero threshold model but asymmetry is only permitted through the
ECM terms. This model has the best performance according to all statistics but the
improvement in the ﬁt is very small. The R2 for the symmetric model is 86% and this only
increases to 86.2% for the chosen asymmetric model. The fractional improvements in the
AIC and SBC are of a similar magnitude. Thus, although the statistics prefer the non-zero
threshold model, the evidence in favour of this model relative to the symmetric model is
weak. Nonetheless, we estimate this model and examine its properties.
The R2 for the symmetric diesel model is 77%, compared to 71% in the Irish market. The
asymmetric ECM model again fails to change the ﬁt of the model to any signiﬁcant degree.
When the zero threshold for the reﬁned price is considered, there is an improvement in all
statistics. The model is based on the current change in the reﬁned price and asymmetry is
allowed in both the ECM and lag coeﬃcients. This is an example of the three regime model
in which all relevant coeﬃcients vary. Non-zero threshold models fail to improve on the ﬁt
of the zero threshold model. The improvement in ﬁt relative to the symmetric model are
more meaningful here compared to the petrol case.
16Table 5 presents the coeﬃcients for the selected petrol and diesel models for the UK
market. In the case of petrol, the asymmetry in the model comes from diﬀerent coeﬃcients
on the ECM terms in the three diﬀerent regimes. The coeﬃcients on the ECM terms are
-0.493, -0.434 and -0.233 for regime 3, the neutral regime and regime 2 respectively. Regime
2, the positive regime, has a change in the reﬁned price which is above threshold and a
negative equilibrium error. For this negative equilibrium error, the speed of adjustment
coeﬃcient of -0.233 means that upward pressure on prices eliminates nearly 23% of any
equilibrium error in the following period. Regime 3, which is the negative regime, has a
change in the reﬁned price which is below threshold and a positive equilibrium error. In this
regime, the speed of adjustment coeﬃcient means that the downward pressure on prices
eliminates approximately 49% of any equilibrium error in the following period. In the case
of conﬂicting price pressures, the speed of adjustment parameter is about 43%. The error
correction in the system is weakest when there is upward pressure on prices.
For the diesel model, asymmetry is permitted in both the ECM term and the lags.
We see that the coeﬃcient on the ECM in regime 3 is again greater than in regime 2,
again suggesting weaker error correction in the upward direction. However, the diﬀerence
between the two is not statistically signiﬁcant according to the bootstrap test. The ECM
term for the regime with conﬂicting price pressure is not statistically signiﬁcant. The
summed coeﬃcients on the reﬁned price terms are 0.763, 0.437 and 0.917 for the positive,
conﬂicting and negative regimes respectively. As with the Irish results, the parameter sums
are greater when price pressures are unambiguously positive or negative. Although the
response is slightly stronger for the negative regime, the positive and negative parameter
sums are not statistically diﬀerent. For the positive regime, the impact is quite evenly
spread between periods t and t−1. For the negative regime, the impact is more immediate
with a stronger response in period t relative to t − 1. The UK results are consistent with
the Irish results in that they provide no support for the theory that retailers respond more
quickly to price increases.
The asymmetry in the UK markets for petrol and diesel diﬀers to the extent that the
asymmetry comes through the error correction mechanism for petrol but through the direct
response to changes in reﬁned prices for diesel. When we consider the UK and Irish results in
tandem, the asymmetry and its speciﬁcation is similar. For both Irish markets and the UK
diesel market, the asymmetry is manifested through the coeﬃcients on the lagged changes
17in reﬁned prices. The improvement in ﬁt for these models relative to the symmetric model
may be modest but it is clear that asymmetry exists. The price response is stronger for the
regimes with reinforcing price pressures. Furthermore, when we compare the positive and
negative regimes, there is evidence of modest asymmetry in favour of the negative direction.
These results show no support for the contention that retailers respond more quickly to
increases in the international price of oil.
7 Importance of Multi-Regime Speciﬁcation
While some papers in the literature acknowledge that there may be conﬂicting price pres-
sures from reﬁned price changes and the equilibrium error, the models are still restricted
to two regimes based on the behaviour of some threshold variable or occasionally in terms
of the equilibrium error. There are some instances of three regime models but the three
regimes are deﬁned according to the behaviour of one threshold variable. We believe that
that it is important to consider the price pressures from both the ECM term and a threshold
variable through a multi-regime model of the sort used in this paper.
As a counterfactual exercise, we take the models chosen earlier with the best model
selection statistics and compare these models to the best performing two regime models.
The two regime models are chosen according to the same methods used for the three regime
model. The regimes are deﬁned according to whether the reﬁned price threshold variable
is above or below its threshold value and so no account is taken of whether the equilibrium
error is positive or negative. Table 6 presents the model selection statistics for these two
regime models. For convenience, it also contains the statistics for the symmetric models
and the corresponding three regime models reported in earlier tables.
With the exception of the UK petrol market, the two regime model is generally out-
performed by the three regime model. Thus, in most cases in this paper, the division of
samples into periods of wholly positive or negative price pressures helps to improve the ﬁt
of the model. The two regime models outperform the symmetric models on the balance of
evidence but the improvement in ﬁt is generally small. Ostensibly, it appears that both
the two and three regime models ﬁnd the same asymmetry but that the more reﬁned three
regime model picks it up more clearly. Closer examination of the two regime models shows
18that this is not always the case. For Irish petrol prices, the two regime model is virtu-
ally identical to the three regime model.7 For diesel, the asymmetry in the two regime
model comes from a larger coeﬃcient for one of the ECM terms. However, the bootstrap
procedure shows the ECM coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent so the model collapses
to the symmetric case. Thus, for the Irish diesel market, we would conclude there is no
asymmetry if using two regime threshold models.
In the case of the UK petrol market, asymmetry in the three regime model is found
in the ECM terms, with upward pressure weaker than downward pressure. The selected
two regime model also ﬁnds some evidence of asymmetry in the ECM coeﬃcients and the
bootstrap procedure conﬁrms that the diﬀerence in the ECM coeﬃcients is statistically
diﬀerent at the 5% level. In contrast to the three regime case, it is the negative ECM
term which is greater for the two regime model and so the results are completely diﬀerent.
As the ECM terms are now deﬁned according to the threshold variable, this means that
there is stronger error correction when the change in the reﬁned price is negative. This
case highlights most clearly the problem with allowing diﬀerent ECM responses based only
on another threshold variable - it is very diﬃcult to interpret the meaning of the ECM
coeﬃcients because the equilibrium error could be positive or negative when the reﬁned
price change is below threshold.
For the UK diesel market, the best performing two regime model is identical to the
three regime model. However, the model selection statistics do not provide strong evidence
in favour of the two regime model over the symmetric model. As a result, the symmetric
model is likely to be chosen when in fact an asymmetric model is required. This exercise
demonstrates that two regime models based on a threshold variable can lead to signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent results to those from three regime models (or four regimes where the data permit).
In two of the four markets, we may have concluded there is no asymmetry using conventional
models and in third market, we would have found asymmetry of the opposite direction. As
the model selections statistics show that multi-regime models have the best performance, it
is critical to divide observations into periods of wholly positive or negative price pressures
when assessing asymmetry. Given that the literature is almost entirely dependent on two
regime models, it raises serious questions regarding existing ﬁndings of asymmetry in other
markets.
7Tables outlining the ceoﬃcients of the four 2 regime models are not provided in the interests of brevity.
198 Summary and Conclusion
A range of structural indicators suggest that Irish retail fuel markets at national level are
comparatively competitive, with the markets characterised by relatively tight margins. Still,
the perception persists that the retail transport fuel market in Ireland may not be entirely
competitive with consumers not beneﬁtting from falls in crude oil prices with the same
rapidity as they are burdened with rises in crude oil prices. This perception is to a large
extent based on anecdotal evidence only, as there is a dearth of studies that have empirically
tested whether Irish fuel markets are characterised by asymmetric pricing behaviour. The
NCA investigated the movements of reﬁned prices, wholesale prices and retail pump prices
in Ireland during 2008. While the NCA concluded that there is little evidence to suggest
unwarranted delays in the passing through of reﬁned oil price falls to consumer prices, their
study was based on a just one year of data and did not assess the issue using econometric
models. In contrast, this paper contains a rigorous econometric assessment of the pass-
through of oil prices in Irish liquid fuel markets using a long span of data. The UK fuels
market is also examined for comparison purposes.
The econometric analysis uses threshold autoregressive models to test for asymmetries
in the Irish fuel markets. The paper contains a methodological note on the importance of
allowing for 3 or 4 regimes in the threshold model speciﬁcation rather than the two regimes
that is standard in the literature. The extension to more than two regimes recognises the
conﬂicting price pressures that may arise from short change dynamics and disequilibrium
errors. This paper demonstrates that two regime models for a given threshold variable can
lead to signiﬁcantly diﬀerent results to those for three regime models (or four regimes where
the data permit). In two of the four markets, it may have been concluded there is no asym-
metry using conventional models and in third market, asymmetry of the opposite direction
would have been found. As the model selection statistics show that multi-regime models
(i.e. more than two regimes) have the best performance, it is important to divide observa-
tions into periods of wholly positive or negative price pressures when assessing asymmetry.
Given that the literature typically relies on two regime models, it raises questions regarding
existing ﬁndings of asymmetry in other markets.
For the Irish petrol and diesel markets, the pass-through of reﬁned oil price falls appears
to be more immediate when price pressures are unambiguously negative. This is in contrast
to the popular perception that retailers respond more quickly when prices are positive. The
20asymmetry in the UK markets for petrol and diesel diﬀers to the extent that the asymmetry
comes through the error correction mechanism for petrol and through the direct response
to changes in reﬁned prices for diesel. When we consider the UK and Irish results in
tandem, the model speciﬁcations and the ﬁndings of asymmetry are broadly similar. For
both Irish petrol and diesel markets and also the UK diesel market, there is a faster response
to declines in reﬁned prices when price pressures are unambiguously negative. This is a
somewhat unexpected result but similar ﬁndings can be been found in the literature on
asymmetries for the UK fuel market. Also, while such asymmetry may be statistically
signiﬁcant, it is unlikely to be economically signiﬁcant. More to the point, there is clearly
no evidence in either the Irish or UK liquid fuel markets to support the “rockets and
feathers” hypothesis that retail prices rise faster than they fall in response to changes in oil
prices at a national level. This does not exclude the possibiity that at a more local level a
lack of competition may accommodate asymmetric pricing behaviour.
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23Figure 3: Model with Threshold at Zero
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Figure 4: Model with Non-Zero Threshold
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24Figure 5: Retail-Refined Spread and Equilibrium Error for Petrol
Difference between Retail Price and Refined Price




















5Table 1: Coeﬃcients of Long Run Cointegration Equations
Petrol Ireland Diesel Ireland
Regressor ARDL OLS ARDL OLS
α 16.856 16.920 18.753 19.175
Std. Error 0.610 0.511 0.377 0.441
φ 0.967 0.960 1.012 0.993
Std. Error 0.023 0.019 0.013 0.015
Petrol UK Diesel UK
Regressor ARDL OLS ARDL OLS
α 7.864 7.927 9.831 9.705
Std. Error 0.505 0.394 0.982 0.402
φ 1.009 1.004 1.019 0.993
Std. Error 0.019 0.015 0.035 0.015
Note: The dependent variable is the retail price and the independent is the reﬁned price.
All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The ARDL columns refers to coeﬃcients
estimated using the Peseran et al (2001) one-step non-linear approach while the coeﬃcients
in the OLS columns are estimated using the two-stage Engle-Granger OLS method.
Table 2: Overview of Model Performance
PETROL
Model Type of Asymm Thresh. Var AIC SBC R2
Symmetric N/A N/A 3.479 3.603 0.787
Asymmetric ECM ECM Only N/A 3.488 3.631 0.787
Zero Threshold Lags Only Current 3.364 3.508 0.811
Threshold = -0.4c ECM and Lags Moving 3.421 3.606 0.803
DIESEL
Model Type of Asymm Thresh. Var AIC SBC R2
Symmetric N/A N/A 3.644 3.748 0.714
Asymmetric ECM ECM Only N/A 3.632 3.757 0.719
Zero Threshold Lags Only Moving 3.532 3.655 0.741
Note: Please refer to the ﬁrst paragraph of section 3.5 for description of this table.
In addition, a glossary of model descriptions is provided at the back of the paper.
26Table 3: Coeﬃcients for Selected Model Speciﬁcation
Petrol Diesel
Regressor Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error
Constant 0.146 0.088 0.100 0.109
ecmt−1 -0.434 0.087 -0.699 0.070
∆PR2






∆PRt−2 0.163 0.030 0.159 0.068
∆PR3
t 0.662 0.106 0.532 0.082
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the retail price. ∆PRt is the change in the
reﬁned price. The superscript “2” refers to regime 2, the superscript “3” refers to regime 3
and no superscript for the other regime. All coeﬃcients signiﬁcant at 10% level except for
constant in diesel equation.
Table 4: Overview of Model Performance for the UK
PETROL
Model Type of Asymm Thresh. Var AIC SBC R2
Symmetric N/A N/A -6.377 -6.275 0.860
Asymmetric ECM ECM only N/A -6.377 -6.255 0.860
Zero Threshold ECM only Moving -6.377 -6.235 0.861
Threshold = 0.5c ECM Only Moivng -6.382 -6.239 0.862
DIESEL
Model Type of Asymm Thresh. Var AIC SBC R2
Symmetric N/A N/A -6.014 -5.912 0.768
Asymmetric ECM ECM only N/A -6.008 -5.886 0.768
Zero Threshold ECM and Lags Current -6.076 -5.914 0.786
Threshold = -1.1c Lags only Moving -6.051 -5.868 0.782
Note: Table 4 has same structure as Table 2.
27Table 5: Coeﬃcients for Selected UK Models
Petrol Diesel
Regressor Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error
Constant 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
ecm2
t−1 -0.233 0.090 -0.226 0.173
ecmt−1 -0.434 0.120
ecm3












Note: The structure of Table 5 is similar to Table 3. For the petrol model, there is no
asymmetry in the lags of the reﬁned price so the superscripts do not apply.
28Table 6: Comparison of Symmetric, 2 Regime and 3 Regime Models
PETROL IRELAND
Model AIC SBC R2
Symmetric 3.479 3.603 0.787
3 Regime Model 3.364 3.508 0.811
2 Regime Model 3.452 3.658 0.798
DIESEL IRELAND
Model AIC SBC R2
Symmetric 3.644 3.748 0.714
3 Regime Model 3.532 3.655 0.741
2 Regime Model 3.638 3.763 0.718
PETROL UK
Model AIC SBC R2
Symmetric -6.377 -6.275 0.860
3 Regime Model -6.382 -6.239 0.862
2 Regime Model -6.403 -6.281 0.864
DIESEL UK
Model AIC SBC R2
Symmetric -6.014 -5.912 0.768
3 Regime Model -6.076 -5.914 0.786
2 Regime Model -6.005 -5.863 0.769
Note: The 3 Regime Model is the model with the best performance statistics found in the
earlier part of the paper. The 2 Regime model is chosen using the same criteria as the 3
regime model but regimes are deﬁned according to the treshold variable.
29Glossary of Terms used to Describe Models
There are a wide variety of models used in the paper. This glossary explains the
terminology used and provides a brief description of the models. The terms used
here appear in Tables 2, 4 and 6.
Symmetric: This is the standard short-run equation from a cointegration model.
Asymmetric ECM: In this type of model, the speed of adjustment parameters in the
short-run equation are allowed to vary depending on whether the equilibrium error
is positive or negative.
Zero Threshold Model: In this type of model, parameters in the short-run equation
are allowed to vary depending on whether the threshold variable is above or below
zero. Tables 2 and 4 outline the parameters which are permitted to vary and the
threshold variable. The zero threshold models also divide the sample according to
positive and negative equilibrium errors. This results in four diﬀerent regimes but
the two regimes with conﬂicting price pressures are merged to give a three regime
model.
Non-Zero Threshold Model: This type of model allows the threshold variable to have
a non-zero threshold value. In all other respects, it is identical to the zero threshold
model.
2 Regime Model: This type of model allows parameters in the short-run equation
to vary depending on whether the threshold variable is above or below its threshold
value. The threshold value may be zero or non-zero. The value of the equilibrium
error is irrelevant.
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